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Rbstract - In the AI community, there is an ongoing debate as to 
the most appropriate theory of inferencing under uncertainty. 
This paper explores the problem of inference from a different 
perspective. It is suggested that an inferencing system should 
reflect an inference policy that is tailored to the domain of 
problems to which it is applied -- and furthermore that an 
inference polic y  need not conform to any general theory of 
rational inference or induction. We note, for instance, that 
Bayesian reasoning about the probabilistic c haracteristics of an 
inference domain may result in the specification of � non­
Bayesian procedure for reasoning within the inference domain. In 
this paper, the idea of an inference policy is explored in some 
detail. To support this exploration, the characteristics of some 
standard and nonstandard inference po l ic ies are examined. 
1.0 SATISFYING REQUIREMENTS 
Consider the following, admitedly artificial, scenario. An 
inference system must be designed to support a human decision 
maker. The inference system lias on 1 y two sources of ev ide nee; 
degree of belief inputs from expertl and expert2. For the domain 
in question, the judgments of both sources are believed to be 
reliable. That is approximately X proportion of inferences 
be 1 i eved to degree X are correct ( Hor wich , 1982). Furthermo re , 
expertl's judgment are generally more extreme than expert2 . 
However, it is uncertain as to the extent to which the two agents 
judgments are redundant or independent . Since the system must 
support a human decision maker, it is c ons idered desirable that 
the inference system also be reliable. Reliability makes it 
easier for a user to determine circ umst anc es when the aid's 
advice should be accepted, which often increases the accuracy of 
the user/machine combination [Lehner, et.al., 1989]. 
What sort of inference policy will satisfy these requirements? 
One polic y which meets these requirements is simply to i gn ore 
expert2 and routinely ac c ept the judgments of expertl. From the 
perspective of most quantitative theories of inference, this is R 
bad ide a -- it routinely ignores obviously useful information. 
However. since the relationship between the judgments of the two 
experts is not known, it is not clear how one might merge the two 
sources of information and still maintain reliability. 
Consequently, while for individual problems within the inference 
domain this policy seems suboptimal, it may be appropriate for 
the inference domain as a whole. 
224 
More generally, inference policies should be designed to satisfy 
a set of requirements determined by examining the anticipated 
characteristics of an inference domain. Often, a standard 
inference policy (Bayesain, Shaferian, etc.) will s atisfy the 
requirements. Other times, a nonstandard inference policy is 
needed. Below we examine below s ome standard and nonstandard 
inference policies to illustrate this approach. 
2.0 STANDARD INFERENCE POLIC IES 
We consider below some standard policies, and the types of domain 
requirements they satisfy. A standard inference policy is 
defined here as an inference procedure based on any theory of 
inference seriously considered in the inductive reasoning 
literature. 
2.1 Bavesian models 
Proponents of the so-called Bayesian approach are generally 
characertized by their insistence that the only rational systems 
of belief values are point-valued probability models. There are 
several different lines of argument for this strong assertion. 
Two of the more popular ones are the Dutchbook and scoring rule 
arguments. According to the Outchbook argument an agents belief 
values do not conform to the probability calculus iff there 
exists a Dutchbook (no-win) gamble that the agent would willingly 
play. Assuming that ideally rational agents do not accept such 
gambles, we must conclude that the belief values of such agents 
conform to the probability calculus. Another line is the scoring 
rule argument. If an agent wishes to minimizes her error rate, 
and the scoring rule for measuring error is additive, then the 
expected error rate is minimal only if the agents belief values 
are derived from the probability calculus [Lindley, 1982]. 
While these arguments may support the Bayesian view of rational 
induction, they do not support the notion that point-valued 
Bayesian models are necessarily a good inference policy. To show 
this, we need only point out (as illustrated in Section 1.0) that 
Bayesian reasoning about the characteristics of an inference 
domain may lead one to conclude that the best inference policy 
within a domain is non-Bayesian. It seems inconsistent for n 
Bayesian to insist that Bayesian inference is necessarily the 
best inference policy. 
On the other hand, for inference domains that require point­
valued estimates, and minimizing error rate seems the appropriate 
goal, it is hard to imagine how a non-Bayesian system could be 
appropriate. 
2. 2 Interval Probabilitv Models 
The standard litany on expert system {ES) technology claims that 
ESs encode human expert knowledge. Consequently, a properly 
engineered ES should make the same inferences that a human expert 
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would. In the k nowledge engineering literature, it is considered 
desirable to base a knowledge base on multiple experts. 
Consequently, an ES should encode the common knowledge of experts 
and generate belief values that conform with this common 
knowledge. If experts disagree, then a point-value system cannot 
possibly reflect common expert knowledge. On the other hand, it 
is arguable that interval probability systems do maintain common 
knowledge. If each expert has a goal of minimizing error rate, 
then each experts belief judgments should conform to the 
probability calculus. If the knowledge base is composed of 
interval pro babi l i ty statements that are consistent with each 
experts judgments, then probability statements derivable from 
that k nowledge base should also be consistent with the judgments 
of all the experts. 
2. 3 Nonmonotonic Reasoning Logics 
Recently, A I  researchers have developed a number of formal logics 
within which it is possible to make defeasible inferences 
categorical inferences that can be later retracted without 
introducing an inconsistency [Reiter, 1987]. The original 
justification for this approach was the that people often "jump 
to conclusions" in the context of deductively incomplete data. 
Probabilists have noted some fundamental problems 
defeasible logics, which can lead them to jump 
improbable conclusions. Most of them, for instance, 
to some form of the lottery paradox. As a theory of 
therefore, defeasible logics leave much to be desired. 
with these 
to highly 
are subject 
inference, 
Despite such problems, however, there are some domains where a 
defeas ible logic may be an appropriate inference po l icy. 
Consider, for instance, a domain that satisfies the following 
criteria. 
Intentionally Benign. Inferential cues are intentionally 
designed to support correct inferences, particularly when 
negative consequences may result from false infernces. 
Reliable Feedback. If the agent acts in accordance with a false 
inference that may lead to a negative outcome, then the agent 
will receive feedback that the inference was false. 
Opportunity to Backtrack. The agent will have an opportunity to 
backtrack decisions prior to the occurrence of significant 
negative consequences. 
In a consistently benign environment categorical inferences based 
on a defeasible logic seems an appropriate inference policy, even 
though the logic itself may be inappropriate as a theory of 
inference. 
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3.0 NONSTANDARD INFERENCE POLICIES 
We define a nonstandard inference policy to be �n infere nce 
procedure that does not correspond t o any seriously considered 
theory of inference found in the literature. Obviously, the 
classification of an inference policy as nonstandard may change 
with the promotion of new theories. In this section, we exami ne 
some possible nonstandard polic ies . 
3. 1 Ratios of Possibilities 
Logical probability theory not withstanding, perhaps one of the 
most maligned concepts in inference theory is the idea th at one 
c an calculate a reasonable belief value for a pr oposit i on by 
deduc i ng the ratio of possible states in which the proposition is 
true. To give a typical counter example, if we accept the axiom 
a-->b, then Bel(b)=.67; since {a,b), {�a,b), and {�a,�b) are the 
three possible states. Suppose , however, that a is " R over is a 
br own dog . "  and b is "Rover is a dog . " In that case, the axiom 
a-->b certainly does not add any evidence that should impact ones 
degree of belief that "Rover is a brown dog." Yet according to 
the Possibility Ratio approach it has a major impact. Clearly, 
therefore , there is no necessary connect i on between a ratio of 
possibl e states and the perceived probability of a p rop osi tion . 
Consequently, it is hard to imagine how � theory of inference can 
be based solely on possible world ratios. 
However there may be domains where the simplistic ratio approach 
is an app r opriate inference policy. This is because the 
procedure for enumerating possible states is rarely arbitrary. 
To see how this works, consider Laplace's rule of induction. 
This r ule states that in a series of observations of some event a 
or ��. that after observing N occ urences of �. and no instances 
of �a, then the inductive probability that 8 will occur on the 
next tr ial is l+N/2+N. Th i s rule of induction is a special case 
of Carnap ' s c� function, which in t urn is one instance of a 
family of coherent ind uct ion functions [Carnap, 1952]. Now 
consider a truth table containing the sixteen possible states 
for four propositions: 8, b, c and d. The proposition of 
interest is a. The other pro positions are considered as 
c andidates for a determin istic causal model for predicting 8. 
Initially no causal connections are posited. Consequently , the 
possibility ratio ( PR) of sis PR(s)=l/2. After one obser-vation 
of 8 we posit the causal rule b-->8. Now 8 will be contained in 
exactly 8 of the 12 remaining possible states; so PR(8)=2/3. 
After event 8 occurs again, we add c-->b - g i ving us PR(a)=3/4. 
Finally, after a occurs a fourth time, we add d-->c, giving us 
PR(a)=4/5. Cont inuing this process we see the P R(a)=l+N/2+N. 
Our learning mechanism replicated this rule of induction. In 
general, any coherent rule of induction can be emulated with a 
causal learning model [Lehner, 1989]. 
We now turn this a r oun d . If a causal learning scheme responds to 
new instances by seeking deterministic rules for pred i cting that 
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instance, then one would expect a postive correlation between the 
relat i ve f requency of an event, and the proportion of possible 
states containing that event. The more of ten X occurs, the 
greater the number of f actors perceived as causally leadi ng to X, 
resulting in a g reater proportion of logically possible states 
containing X. 
For some domains, theref ore, ratios of possible states may 
provide a perfectly reasonable inference policy. Even though the 
causal learn i ng mechanism may not explicitly take into account 
probab i listic considerat i ons (e.g ., as in most concept learning 
and explanation-based learning systems), there may be g ood reason 
to believe one can extract reasonable belief values from such 
systems. 
3.2 Possibilitv and Probability 
In section 1.0, we discussed an inference domain where reliable 
judgments were required. Here we expand a little on this i dea. 
Consider the following problem. An inf erence system must be 
developed that must service the information requirements of 
multiple decision systems. Each decision system will query the 
inference module as needed regarding the status (truth value or 
degree of support) of certain propositions. The spec i fic 
proposit i ons queried w i ll vary in each context. 
Since the propos i tions to be queried cannot be pred i cted, it is 
decided that the inference system will maintain an up-to-date 
description of the current situation. That is, for some set of 
atomic propositions and their logically distinct combinations, 
the system should be able to report a belief value on request. 
Finally, it is considered important that the inference system be 
reliable. That is, for each set Sx (all sentences believed to 
degree X), the expected proportion of truths in Sx is X. The 
reason for this is simply that from one problem to the next, the 
elements of Sx that are queried is unpredictable (more or less 
"random"). Consequently, if the system is reliable then the 
expected proportion of truths of propositions reported with 
degree of belief X is X. 
What type of inf erence policy would guarantee satisfying these 
requirements? As it turns out [Lehner, 1989), provable relia­
bility i s  achievable only if the system maintains (A) a set of 
possible states that contain the true state, ( B) a set (possibly 
empty) of reliable probability statements that assigns point­
values to a partition of the possible states, and (C) belief 
values are set equal to 
where r1 ... rn are sentences uniquely defining each 
p(r�) is the probability of r�, and c(qlr�) is the 
possible states in the r�-partition that contain 
thermore, pr�cise reli•bility (for each set s� 
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partition, 
ratio of 
q. Fur­
exactly X 
proportion are true) can a l ways be achieved by ignoring a l l 
probability information and on l y  the possib l e  states ratio. 
This result has an interesting ramification. Re l iabi l ity is 
always achievable, but only at the cost of ignoring some useful 
probabi l ity information. Re l iabi l ity and accuracy tradeoff. 
Minimizing expected error requires conformance to the probability 
ca l culus, thereby giving up on reliabi l ity. On the other hand, 
re l iability is only guaranteed if the inference system reports 
judgments that do not conform to the probabi lity calculus. To 
i l lustrate , suppose an inference system knew p(a)=.8 and p(b)=.6, 
but had no information on p(a&b). As shown in Table 1, there are 
two sets of belief values that are provably reliable, and one 
that is precise l y  re l iab l e. 
TABLE 1 
ILLUSTRATION OF THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN ACCURACY AND RELIABIL ITY 
(expected error = p ( a ) ll - b(a)]Z + p( .. a)LO-b(a)]� + 
p ( b ) [ 1 -b ( b } ) 2 + p ( .. b )[ 0-b ( b ) )2 ) 
Belief Values 
a b 
.8 
. 8 
.5 
.5 
.6 
. 5 
. 6  
.5 
Expected Error 
(for a and b on l y) 
. 4 
. 4 1 
.49 
.50 
Re l iabi li ty 
(for al l statements) 
none guaranteed 
provab l y  re l iab l e  
provably reliab l e  
precisely re l iab l e  
From the perspec tive of infe rence policy, therefore, the 
appropriate degree of belief ca l culus depends on the relative 
i mportan ce of reliab i l i ty vs. ac curacy. 
Note here how the characterization of an inference domain 
impacts the assessment of whether an inference po l icy is 
appropriate. The importance of prov ab l e  re l iabi lity depends in 
part on the inability to anticipate which propositions will be 
queried . If we knew, for instance , that the inferenc e  domain was 
such that only propos i tions for which reliab l e  probability 
information was available would be queried , then ignoring this 
probability infor-mation would make little sense. 
3. 3 Introspection and Probability 
A c oncept endemic to nonmonotonic reasoning logics is t he idea 
that negative introspection can provide evidential support for a 
hypothesis. For instance, in an aut oe pistemic logic, the 
sentence .. L '"p-- >p reads "If I cannot c one 1 ude .. P, p is true," or 
equ i valently , "if p were false, I'd know it." 
In everyday human affairs, this type of reasoning is quite 
common . It occurs whenever a person feels that he or she is 
k now led g eabl e on some topic ("My husband cou l d  not have been 
cheating on me," she said to the inspector, "for if he were, I 
would surely have k nown it.") It is a l so a characteristic of 
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most conversations, where by convention it is assumed that all 
relevant inf orm at ion is communicated l Reit er, 1987]. 
Probabilitv Models of Negative Introspection 
From a probabi li t y perspective, evidence-from-introspection pro­
vides some fa sci nating problems. In a probabilistic system, one 
could conceivable model categor ical belief using an epsilon 
semantics [Pearl, 198 8]. That is, if X is an agent's belief 
threshold , then the agent believes p (i.e., Lp) if P(p:E)>X, 
where E i s  the current evidence. An epsilon-semantics 
translation of "'L"'p-->p might be P(p: 'P(p)>(l-X)' )=X. 
If X=.l, then as long as t he agent cannot deduce �P with 
probability .9, t hat agent immediately concludes p with pro­
babilit y .9. This seems reasonable, if a lit tle unusual. 
Suppose however that the agent decides to set a more conservat ive 
belief threshold, say X=.99. Now our agent concludes p with 
probability .99 whenever �P cannot be deduced with .99 certainty. 
The more conservative the t hresho ld , the less evidence needed for 
the agent to jump to a stronger conclusion. An epsi lon seman­
tics seems inappropriate here. Other self-referential ap­
proaches seem to h ave similar problems. 
Given problems such as these a probabilist might be tempted to 
suggested that belief models should not have probability values 
conditional on se l f -ref erential probability stat ements , but 
should only be conditional on th e original evidence items. A 
sta:ement such as "'L"'p-->p could simply be interpreted as 
P(p:"'E1� . . . A"'En) = High. wher e the E� are relevant evidence items 
which did not occur. Howev e r . this approach fails to account for 
the fact that people do seem to us e negative introspection as a 
source of evi de nce . Consequently. it cannot be used to encode 
human expert judgment. (As far as I know there is no reason to 
believe that negative int r ospect i on is inherent l y incoherent.) 
Also, the number of nonoccuring evidence items can be quite 
l arge , if not inf i nit e -- making the development of such models 
infeasible i n  practice and perhaps impossible in theory. 
Probability Analvsis of Negative Introspection 
Whether or not it is po ssible to develop probability model of 
negative introspection is unrelated to the issue of whether or 
not a pr obabil ity analysis of negative intr ospecti on is useful. 
That is, a probabilistic analysi s  of an introspection-based 
inference policy may be quite informative. 
To i l lust rate , consider the default rule a:b:--b, which st ates 
that if propo siti o n a is believed and it is cons i stent to believe 
b, then infer b. The aut oepi stemic logic equivalent of this rule 
is La A �L�b --> b. Presumably, when a knowl edge engineer add s a 
default rule like this to a know l edge base she believes that for 
the inference domain to which it will be applied the default rule 
will usually g enerate a valid conclusion. As a re sult whether or 
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not an inference system implements a probability model, there is 
still a probebilistlc justification for each default rule that is 
added to a knowledge base. Probabilistically, the standard 
justfication for a rule such as this is simply that P(b:a)=High, 
while an alternative justification, based on the communication 
convention interpretation, might be P(blLaA�L�b)=High, 
Consider the following case. An inference system contains the 
default rules {a:bl--b, c:dl--d} and material implications {d-­
>�b, c-->a}. Upon learning c, two extensions result, one 
containing b and "'d, the second containing "'b and d. If the 
rules are interpreted in the standard way, then the first rule 
can be shown to be provably irr�l�vant since P(blc)=P(blaAc) � ( 1  
- P(dla A c))=P(dlc), where by provable irrelevance I simply mean 
that enough evidence has been acquired to make the posterior 
assessment of the probability of b independent of the value of 
P(bla) in any fully specified probability model. If in fact the 
knowledge engineer had in mind the standard probability 
justifications for her default rules, then the default logic, by 
generating two extensions, is behaving in a manner inconsistent 
with the intentions of the knowledge engineer. Such a system 
does not reflect a satisfactory inference policy. 
On the other hand, if it is assumed that default rules reflect 
communication conventions, then the alternative form for the 
probabil ity justfications more closely reflects the knowledge 
engineers beliefs nbout the inference domain. In this case, 
however, a:b:--b cannot be shown to be provably irrelevant since 
P(blLc A La A �L � b) = P(blLc A � L � b) , of which nothing can be derived. 
More generally, if negative introspection on categorical beliefs 
is viewed as a source of evidence for a default conclusion, then 
no extension can be anomalous in the sense that the probability 
justification for an applicable rule can never be shown to be 
provably irrelevant to a current problem. However, nonmonotonic 
logic theorists seem greatly concerned with the anomalous 
extension problem [Morris, 1988] suggesting therefore that 
nonmonotonic reasoning cannot be justified solely by the notion 
of communication conventions. 
4.0 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this paper, an approach to inferencing under uncertainty wns 
explored that calls for the specification of inference policies 
tailored to specific inference domains. Although the approach 
seems pluralistic, I claim no conflict with the Bayesian 
viewpoint that a rational/coherent system of belief values should 
conform to the probability calculus. As a good scientist, I find 
tbe objective of minimizing the error rate of my theories very 
compelling. F urthermore, my theories involve the development of 
algorithms that I hope will usually work. Consequently, I feel 
compelled to reason probabilistically about the relative 
frequency that applications of my theories will "work". However, 
in my (hopefully) cohe-rent reasoning about inference domains I 
can envision domains where global non-additive objectives (e.g., 
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global reliability) are desirable. Consequently, 
why coherent reasoning about an inference 
necessarily lead to Bayesian inference policy as 
approach to inferencing within a domain . 
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